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A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF 
INNOCENCE IN SINGAPORE 
 
Siyuan Chen∗ 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The right to presumption of innocence is said to exist in almost all criminal justice 
systems, including Singapore. Curiously, however, no Singapore case has ever attempted 
to establish the exact source and contours of this longstanding right. This is 
unsatisfactory, as this diminishes the meaningfulness of what is supposed to be a 
fundamental right in the criminal justice process. The primary aim of this article is thus to 
conduct a preliminary survey of the law on the presumption of innocence in Singapore. It 
begins by proposing the Woolmington conception as a workable starting point, but posits 
a guiding principle to further determine the scope of the right (Part I). On that footing it 
surveys the various sources of law in Singapore to identify the relevant rules that could 
either protect or detract from the right (Part II), and concludes with some reflections on 
the results of the survey (Part III), including the tentative suggestion that, on the proposed 
conceptualisation at least, the right to presumption of innocence could be better protected 
in Singapore and may need to be properly reconceptualised altogether. 
 
2  OVERVIEW 
Viscount Sankey LC famously wrote in Woolmington v DPP: 
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, 
that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt… If at the end of and on 
the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given… the 
prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the 
principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common 
law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.1 
It has been claimed that this passage refers to the presumption of innocence, a concept 
that ‘is unchallenged in the common law world’.2 It has also been said that the 
presumption of innocence is ‘among the small handful of doctrines in criminal law that 
are ubiquitous across a very broad spectrum of legal systems’,3 and can be traced back to 
Babylonian times.4 But to what extent is this highly extolled right well-entrenched in 
Singapore –  for instance, can it be said that in the balance that has been struck between 
the rights of the accused and the interests of the community,5 Singapore only has a ‘weak’ 
version of the right as compared to other so-called ‘rights-conscious,’ less 
‘communitarian’ jurisdictions?6 Indeed, apart from the occasional judicial reference to 
                                                          
∗ Author please insert affiliation; acknowledgments (where relevant) 1  [1935] AC 462 at 481 (Woolmington). This passage has been cited with approval in Singapore, 
notably in XP v PP [2008] 4 SLR(R) 686, [90] and AOF v PP [2012] SGCA 26, [2] and [315]. 2  Michael Hor, ‘The Burden of Proof in Criminal Justice’ (1992) 4(2) Sac Law Journal 267, 268–269. 3  Larry Laudan, ‘The Presumption of Innocence: Material or Probatory?’ (2005) 11 Legal Theory 333, 
333.  4  Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart: 
2010), 1. 5  However, criminal justice discourse need not necessarily be predicated upon individual-versus-society 
assumptions and trade-offs: see generally Melanie Chng, ‘Modernising the Criminal Justice 
Framework – the Criminal Procedure Code 2010’ (2011) 23 SAcLJ 23. 6  Indeed, the idea of weak/strong versions of a concept finds a striking parallel in thin/thick theories of 
the rule of law – the presumption of innocence of course being an essential feature of the rule of law. 
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Woolmington, the right to presumption of innocence only came under greater scrutiny in 
Singapore recently due to several developments, the genesis of which is the 2008 High 
Court decision of XP v PP, where Justice Rajah wrote: 
If the evidence is insufficient to support the Prosecution’s theory of guilt… the judge 
must acquit the accused, and with good reason: it simply has not been proved to the 
satisfaction of the law that the accused is guilty, and the presumption of innocence stands 
unrebutted. It is not helpful… for suggestions to be subsequently raised about the 
accused’s “factual guilt” once he has been acquitted. To do so would… stand the 
presumption of innocence on its head…7 
This position is to be contrasted with the one taken by the Attorney-General’s Chambers 
shortly before XP v PP, where it stated that ‘not being able to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that A is guilty does not mean that he is innocent. He may be guilty in fact, but 
innocent in law.’8 This divergence in position sparked a political debate on the 
presumption of innocence,9 but this debate only highlighted one definitional 
disagreement10 surrounding the presumption of innocence, and served as an unintended 
distraction from the real issues at hand. As will be contended, there are other conceivable 
and more important points of disagreement that impact the scope of the right to 
presumption of innocence, such as reallocations of burden of proof, standards of proof, 
adverse inferences, and various pre-trial and trial rights of the accused.11 This contention 
– that the presumption of innocence needs to be examined beyond the threadbare 
reference to the prosecution needing to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt – 
certainly finds resonance in other jurisdictions.12 Yet in Singapore, no case has ever 
ventured beyond perfunctory references to Woolmington. Indeed, no case has attempted to 
address what the presumption of innocence in Singapore actually entails (including but 
not limited to its justifications and concomitantly, permissible derogations) and the 
logically prior question of where the right is derived from.13 This cannot be satisfactory if 
it is accepted that the presumption of innocence is fundamental to the criminal justice 
process. 
Given the tentative state of affairs, this article endeavours to be a comprehensive survey 
of the likely constitutional, statutory, and common sources of law on the presumption of 
innocence in Singapore, and offers some tentative reflections on the results of the 
survey.14  
                                                          
See also Chin Tet Yeung, ‘Remaking the Evidence Code: Search for Values’, (2009) 21 SAcLJ 52, 
[16]; Chin Tet Yeung, ‘CPC 2010 – Confessions and Statements by Accused Persons Revisited’ 
(2012) 24 SAcLJ 60.  7  XP v PP PP [2008] 4 SLR(R) 686, [94]. 8  KC Vijayan, ‘Judge: No question of “factual guilt” after acquittal,’ The Straits Times, 12 July 2008. 
See also Chan Sek Keong, ‘The criminal process – The Singapore Model’ [1996] Singapore Law 
Review 434, 471. 9  See eg, Ministry of Law, Oral answer by Minister of Law K Shanmugam, 25 Aug 2008, 
http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF20015A167.nsf/LookupContentDocsByKey/GOVI-
7HU5N8?OpenDocument. Accessed on 30/01/2012.  10  See generally previous n 3. 11  See eg, Ian Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 3rd ed (Sweet & Maxwell: 2007), 509; AP Simester, JR 
Spencer, GR Sullivan, and GJ Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law, 4th ed (Hart: 2010), 59–
65.  12  See eg, Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10(4) E & P 241, 
243–244. 
13  See also Thio Li-ann, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (Academy Publishing: 2012), 
Chapter 11. 14  The last similar attempt appears to be Michael Hor, ‘The Presumption of Innocence – A Constitutional 
Discourse for Singapore’ [1995] SJLS 365. However, Hor’s article was written predominantly from a 
constitutional and comparative constitutional angle, with a particular focus on the burden of proof, and 
an express exclusion of pre-trial rights. Moreover, the article was written almost 20 years ago, and a 
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However, it is necessary to address two important preliminary points. First, this article’s 
endeavour is seemingly short-circuited at the outset by the very aim it seeks to achieve: 
the determination of the scope of the right to presumption of innocence in Singapore and 
the strength of the right. No local cases have seen fit to define the right, and without an 
operative definition/conception, it seems impossible to identify the sources of law that 
either protect or detract from the right. However, this impediment is only partly true, as 
one may legitimately assume the widely conventional view that notions such as 
reallocations of burden of proof are, by their definition and operation, clearly at odds with 
Woolmington’s basic requirement of the prosecution proving a case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. So there is already a workable starting point and a rough preconception of how the 
right might be protected or derogated from. This leads us to the second important point to 
be addressed: such a starting point is not enough for a holistic appraisal of the right; what 
is further needed is the identification of a principle that serves as a guide when there is 
some doubt as to whether a legal rule or concept is relevant to the scope of the right.15 If 
indeed the scope of the right is uncertain, this guiding principle will bar or justify the 
inclusion of anything that respectively broadens or constricts the Woolmington conception 
of presumption of innocence.16  
The aforementioned principle adopted for present purposes is essentially built upon four 
ideas:  
1) Unlike a civil suit which typically involves two private parties with equal access 
to justice and where lesser interests are at stake, an accused person, whose liberty 
(or life) is at stake, will always be at a distinct disadvantage when the powers and 
resources of a state are considered;  
2) Crime control and due process are not necessarily mutually exclusive values and 
in any event (as explained in Part 3) there are signs that Singapore (together with 
many other parts of the world) has gradually shifted towards a greater emphasis 
on due process, paving the way for a more substantive, accused-centred 
conceptualisation of presumption of innocence;  
3) The presumption of innocence has a hallowed status because it presupposes that 
wrongful convictions are simply abhorrent and cannot be justified. If this premise 
is true, an accused should be given as much protection as possible, if not as much 
help as possible, in establishing his innocence; and  
4) There is a real possibility in most criminal cases that there are many different 
types of derogations from the right to presumption of innocence, and such 
derogations in their simultaneous operation can actually combine to whittle down 
the right considerably.  
The principle that emerges from a consideration of these four ideas is the necessity for a 
generous interpretation of the right to presumption of innocence, and an expansive 
conceptualisation of the right that goes beyond mere technical, procedural and evidential 
                                                          
fresh update on the legal developments is in order. Nonetheless, this piece will refer to Hor’s article 
where appropriate, especially as regards the discussion on the Evidence Act (Part 3.2).  
15  Indeed, to use the lexicon of Harvard Professor Lewis Sargentich, the rules of law, when exhausted, 
have to conform to the three ‘Ps’: principles, policies, and purposes.   16  Taking a more normative, accused-centred approach towards the conceptualisation of the right to 
presumption of innocence is certainly not novel, if the experience in the UK is anything to go by. In 
particular, when this jurisdiction had to pass human rights legislation pursuant to their international 
convention human rights obligations such an approach was requried. 
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considerations. It also requires a resolution of any contentious claims as to whether 
something should feature in the determination of the scope of the right to be in the favour 
of the accused. In other words, an accused should be given the maximum leeway to 
defend himself, availed of the maximum range of defences, subject to minimum 
disadvantages, and presumed to have done absolutely no wrong until the prosecution has 
produced sufficient evidence to convict.17 Correspondingly, a commitment to punish only 
the guilty requires that a conviction can only be secured using the most reliable and 
morally defensible evidence. With these preliminary points in mind, we begin the survey 
of the law. 
 
3  A SURVEY OF THE SOURCES OF LAW IN SINGAPORE 
 
3.1  Constitution 
An obvious place to begin must be Singapore’s Constitution,18 since it is the supreme law 
of the land.19 It has been argued that the presumption of innocence may conceivably be 
derived from two fundamental liberty provisions of the Constitution, namely Arts 9(1), 
9(3) and 12(1):20 
9. (1) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with 
law.  
… 
(3) Where a person is arrested, he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of 
his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his 
choice.  
12. (1)  All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the 
law. 
Prima facie, none of these provisions categorically acknowledges the right of the 
presumption of innocence. Article 12(1) can be dealt with first insofar as PP v Taw Cheng 
Kong has already made clear that ‘the concept of equality does not mean that all persons 
are to be treated equally, but simply that all persons in like situations will be treated 
alike’.21 Thus, should Parliament pass legislation that, for instance, creates strict liability 
offences or imposes statutory presumptions (the reason this affects the scope of the right 
to presumption of innocence will be elaborated upon shortly). Such legislation per se will 
not offend the right to equal treatment guaranteed by Art 12(1).22 Suffice to say for now, 
the only broad check against this is the principle that ‘all legal powers… have legal 
limits.’23 The judicial interpretation of Art 9(1) also confirms this. In Ong Ah Chuan v 
PP,24 which dealt with the constitutional validity of a provision in the Misuse of Drugs 
Act,25 Lord Diplock said that the reference to ‘law’ (in, inter alia, Arts 9 and 12 of the 
Constitution) includes ‘fundamental rules of natural justice’ and not simply Parliament-
                                                          17  See also Cheah Wui Ling, ‘Developing a People-Centred Justice in Singapore: In Support of Pro Bono 
and Innocence Work’ (forthcoming, Cincinnati Law Review); Claire Hamilton, ‘Threats to the 
Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal Law: An Assessment’ (2011) 15(3) E&P 181, 188. 18  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
19      Ibid, Art 4. 20  A Constitutional Discourse, supra note 14 at 368.    21  [1998] 2 SLR(R), [54]. See also Mohamed Emran bin Mohamed Ali v PP [2008] 4 SLR(R) 411, [26]. 22  See also Yong Vui Kong v PP [2012] SGCA 23, [17].   23  Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239, [149] (Phyllis Tan), citing 
Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1998] 2 SLR(R) 525, [86]. 24  [1980–81] SLR 48 (Ong Ah Chuan). 25  (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (Misuse of Drugs Act). 
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sanctioned legislation.26 Accordingly, there are indeed limits to the types of legislation 
that Parliament may pass. Flowing from this, one might think that the presumption of 
innocence forms one of the fundamental rules of natural justice and is guaranteed by the 
Constitution.27 However, Lord Diplock has explained that: 
One of the fundamental rules of natural justice in the field of criminal law is that a person 
should not be punished for an offence unless it has been established… that he committed 
it... To describe this fundamental rule as the ‘presumption of innocence’ may, however, be 
misleading to those familiar only with English criminal procedure....28 
Indeed, there are also other obstacles to reading the right to presumption of innocence 
into the Constitution. First, unlike many other constitutions found in other jurisdictions, 29 
the Constitution does not contain any express protection of the presumption of innocence. 
Second, no local cases have gone as far as to say the presumption of innocence is a 
constitutional right, and it should not be assumed that this is because the proposition is 
that trite – the more likely conclusion to be drawn, after decades of constitutional 
jurisprudence, is that the right is not protected by the Constitution.30 Third, there appears 
to be no foreign cases, interpreting a similarly worded Art 9(1), which says the 
presumption of innocence is a constitutional right.31 Fourth, the Court of Appeal has 
recently stated that rules of natural justice (in the Ong Ah Chuan sense) have to be 
construed narrowly and within limited contexts.32 Fifth, the reference in Art 9(1) is to 
deprivation of ‘life or personal liberty’. It is arguable that a fine (or even a probation or 
community order) would not amount to a deprivation of personal liberty. Therefore, if the 
presumption of innocence is read into Art 9(1), an anomalous situation may arise where 
the right to presumption of innocence (at least in terms of the constitutional reach) would 
not operate to protect an accused if the punishment imposed does not amount to a 
deprivation of liberty. 
Having pointed out the various obstacles, perhaps a silver lining is found in Art 9(3) 
providing the right to counsel on arrest. The right to counsel is conceivably relevant, 
albeit admittedly indirectly, to the presumption of innocence insofar as virtually all 
accused persons need the help of lawyers to be informed of their rights and to establish 
their innocence; this is especially so in Singapore which adopts a fiercely adversarial 
system, where the strength (or indeed, existence) of one’s defence may be decided 
entirely by the quality of legal representation.33 There may be many ways in which an 
                                                          26  Ong Ah Chuan [1980–81] SLR 48, [26]. Cf Jabar bin Kadermastan v PP [1995] 1 SLR(R) 326, [53]; 
Nguyen Tuong Van v PP [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103, [82]: Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489, [14]–
[16]. 27  See eg, AJ Harding, ‘Natural Justice and the Constitution’ (1981) Mal LR 226, 232. 28  Ong Ah Chuan [1980–81] SLR 48, [27] (emphasis added). Lord Diplock had the chance to, but did 
not, read the presumption of innocence into Art 9(1) in Ong Ah Chuan. Tis formed a basis for the 
subsequent Canadian Supreme Court decision in  R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 to depart from 
Ong Ah Chuan regarding the constitutionality of statutory presumptions. Cf Haw Tua Tau v PP 
[1981–82] SLR(R) 133, [23]–[26]. 29  See eg, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, s 11(d); South African 
Constitution, s 35(3)(h); Constitution of Russia, Art 49; Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen 1789, Art 9; The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR of the PRC, Art 87; Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 30  Cf Harding, previous n 27, 232. 31  Cf Hor, previous n 14, 370–374; Chan Wing Cheong, ‘The Burden of Proof of Provocation in Murder’ 
[1995] SJLS 229, 232. However, the Belize Constitution that was referred to in these two pieces 
(concerning the Privy Council decision of Vasquez v R [1994] 3 All ER 674) had a much less oblique 
reference to the right of presumption of innocence. 32  Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189, [103]. See also Ramalingam Ravinthran v 
Attorney-General [2012] SGCA 2, [19]–[40] (Ramalingam); Chen Siyuan, ‘The Expanding Limits of 
Prosecutorial Discretion’ SLWC, January 2012, 4. 33  See generally Wui Ling, previous n 17. 
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accused may be acquitted – successfully arguing a defence, pointing out procedural 
breaches in the evidence-gathering, showing involuntariness in the recording of 
statements, proving a lack of mens rea, challenging the validity of an co-accused’s 
testimony – but it is not fanciful to suggest that none of these will be apparent to a 
layperson accused without the benefit of counsel, and even if any of it is somehow 
apparent, it should not be lightly assumed that an accused, without the assistance of 
counsel, is able to make cogent and compelling legal submissions to the court. 
Additionally, without the assistance of counsel, an accused may not be able to withstand 
the rigours of a trial (particularly when under cross-examination) and may unintentionally 
convey misleading signals about his demeanour and credibility to the judge. That the 
Constitution provides for a right to counsel probably goes to show the indispensability of 
counsel in establishing the innocence of an accused. If so, some conceivable facet of the 
presumption of innocence is captured by the Constitution by Art 9(3), although one has to 
bear in mind that this right is not absolute, need not be made known to the accused, and is 
not necessarily immediately available upon arrest.34  
 
3.2 Statutes 
 
3.2.1  Evidence Act 
The (rather antiquated and static) Evidence Act35 establishes the rules pertaining to 
burden of proof and standard of proof – two concepts most closely allied with any 
conception of the presumption of innocence.36 Before proceeding further, it is apposite to 
note that s 2(2) of the Evidence Act states that: ‘All rules of evidence not contained in any 
written law, so far as such rules are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, are 
repealed.’37 That having been said, a suitable starting point of the analysis can be found 
in ss 103 and 104, situated in Part III (Production and Effect of Evidence) of the Evidence 
Act, which state: 
103. (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, 
dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. 
(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of 
proof lies on that person. 
104. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no 
evidence at all were given on either side. 
In criminal cases, the Evidence Act places the burden on the prosecution to prove facts in 
issue. In a similar vein, s 105 generally places the burden of proving relevant facts on the 
prosecution: 
105. The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court 
to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall 
lie on any particular person. 
                                                          34  Tan Chor Jin v PP [2008] 4 SLR(R) 306, [52]–[54] (Tan Chor Jin). 35  (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (Evidence Act).  36  See generally Ashworth, previous n 12; Hor, previous n 14.  
37      See also Phyllis Tan [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239, [117]: ‘...new [common law] rules of evidence can be 
given effect to only if they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the [Evidence Act] or their 
underlying rationale’; Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Rev Ed), s 3(1): ‘The common 
law of England (including the principles and rules of equity), so far as it was part of the law of 
Singapore immediately before 12th  November 1993, shall continue to be part of the law of 
Singapore.’ Cf Tet Yueng, previous n 6, [24]. 
 
 
84 
 
Since Jayasena v R38 has interpreted all burdens in the Evidence Act as referring to legal 
(as opposed to evidential, production or tactical) burdens, the burden imposed on the 
prosecution by ss 103, 104 and 105 is the legal or persuasive burden. As regards the 
standard of proof required under the Evidence Act, s 3(3) states: 
A fact is said to be ‘proved’ when, after considering the matters before it, the court either 
believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under 
the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. 
The Evidence Act applies to civil and criminal proceedings alike and the definition of 
‘proved’ draws no distinction between facts required to be proved by the prosecution in 
criminal proceedings and facts required to be proved by a successful party to civil 
proceedings. This appears contrary to the presumption of innocence’s requirement that the 
standard of proof which the prosecution has to meet in a criminal case must be that of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, this seeming inconsistency was arguably 
reconciled in PP v Yuvaraj,39 which held that the common law standard of beyond 
reasonable doubt is consistent with s 3 of the Evidence Act because a prudent man would 
apply that standard in a criminal case.40 Furthermore, it could not be the case that the 
Evidence Act intended by a provision contained in what purports to be a mere definition 
section to abolish the historic distinction fundamental to the administration of justice 
under the common law.41 Accordingly, the operation of ss 3, 103, 104 and 105 combine to 
place the legal burden of proving guilt beyond all reasonable doubt on the prosecution.42 
It can thus be said that the Evidence Act does provide for the presumption of innocence. 
However, the Evidence Act itself contains several exceptions to this general rule, and it 
may well be that the exceptions erode the rule to such an extent as to significantly cripple 
the protection offered by the presumption of innocence. For instance, s 107 provides:  
107. When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of 
circumstances bringing the case within any of the general exceptions in the Penal Code… 
or within any special exception or proviso… or in any law defining the offence, is upon 
him, and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. 
The exceptions found in the Penal Code43 provide that if an accused relies on the defence 
of accident, this effectively goes towards the requisite mens rea, so he has the burden of 
proving this (s 107) on a balance of probabilities, even though s 103 dictates that it is for 
the prosecution to prove both actus reus and mens rea. R v Chanderasekera44 introduced 
a distinction between defences that raise so-called separate issues (eg, private defence, 
where successful invocation requires proof on balance of probabilities), and those that 
merely challenge the prosecution’s case (eg, accident, where successful invocation only 
requires casting reasonable doubt).45 However, the Court in Jayasena affirmed s 107 
clearly imposes the burden of proof (and not merely the evidential burden) on the accused 
in respect of all general and special exceptions.46 On its face, a significant aspect of s 107 
                                                          38  [1970] AC 618 (Jayasena). 39  PP v Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89 (Yuvaraj). 40  See also Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence, Advocacy and the Litigation Process, 3rd ed (LexisNexis: 2010) 
436. Cf Liew Kaling v PP [1960] MLJ 306, 311.  41  PP v Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89 91. Cf Hor, previous n 14, 389. 
42      Ibid, 374–376. 43  (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed). 44  (1942) 44 NLR 97, 125. 45  See also Wing Cheong, previous n 31, 234. 46  Pinsler, previous n 40, 407. See also Juma’at bin Saad v PP [1993] 2 SLR(R) 327, where the High 
Court held that s 107 of the Evidence Act required the accused to prove the defence (of intoxication) 
on a balance of probabilities if he wanted to invoke it successfully, as opposed to merely casting 
reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s arguments on mens rea; R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193.  
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may not sit comfortably with Woolmington’s conception of the presumption of 
innocence.47  
The erosion of the presumption of innocence also extends to other defences. If we revisit 
s 105, illustration (b)48 suggests that an accused has the legal burden of proof (to prove 
actus reus) if he wishes to plead alibi. It has been argued that an alibi does not necessarily 
go to an element of the prosecution’s case, but may raise fresh issues on its own.49 But 
‘[even if] fresh issues are raised, it cannot be said, generally, that it would be “impossible 
or disproportionate” for the prosecution to bear the burden of persuasion. What, perhaps, 
is difficult for the prosecution to do is to anticipate in advance (and hence disprove) every 
possible alibi the accused may raise.’50 Furthermore,  
the comments… in Jayasena concerning the term ‘proved’ in s 107 (that the accused must 
prove the facts he relies on to the standard prescribed in s 3 of the [Evidence Act]) apply 
equally to the ‘proof’ is s 105 and ‘proved’ in [illustration (b)]. If it is for the prosecution 
to prove that the accused committed the offence, this would involve establishing the 
accused’s presence at the scene, despite the imposition of the burden of proof by s 105 on 
the accused.51  
Yet even assuming the problems of s 105 can be surmounted, there is also s 108:  
108. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of 
proving that fact is upon him. 
Indeed, illustration (a) to the section states that ‘[w]hen a person does an act with some 
intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the 
burden of proving that intention is upon him.’ Section 108 has thus been described as ‘an 
exception to the general rule contained in s 103 of the Evidence Act.’52 The section is 
designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be extremely difficult to 
establish facts which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the accused and yet which 
the accused could prove without real difficulty. The courts have, however, been consistent 
in circumscribing the scope of s 108 in favour of the accused:53 in PP v Abdul Naser bin 
Amer Hamsah, a case involving a murder of a tourist and where the accused pleaded 
accident, the Court of Appeal held that s 108 could not be invoked to place the burden on 
the accused to prove that the injuries sustained by the victim were caused by him 
accidentally stepping on her face.54 In PP v Chee Cheong Hin Constance, it reiterated 
that s 108 does not impose any burden on the accused to prove no crime was 
committed.55 It seems then that under exceptional circumstances, s 108 will only place an 
evidential burden rather than a legal burden on the accused, though this seems 
questionable in the light of Jayasena. The judicial circumscription of s 108 
                                                          47  See also Hor, previous n 2, 272–279; Hor, previous n 14, 376–378. 48  ‘B wishes the court to believe that at the time in question he was elsewhere. He must prove it.’ 49  See eg, Tan Yock Lin, ‘The Incomprehensible Burden of Proof’ [1994] SJLS 29, 32–34; Syed Abdul 
Aziz v PP [1993] 3 SLR(R) 1, [35].  50  Hor, previous n 14, 388. See also Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (Act No 15 of 2010), s 278. 51  Pinsler, previous n 40, 409. See also VR Manohar, ed, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Law of Evidence, 
24th ed (LexisNexis: 2011), 589: ‘...the burden entirely lies on [the accused] and the plea of alibi does 
not come within the meaning of [s 107]. Circumstances leading to alibi are within his knowledge and 
as provided under [s 108] he has to establish the same satisfactorily’ (emphasis in original).  52  Surender Singh v. Li Man Kay [2010] 1 SLR 428, [217].  53  Pinsler, previous n 40, 415–418; Edward Wong v Acclaim Insurance [2010] SGHC 352, [29]–[31]. Cf 
Hor, previous n 14, 383–387.   54  [1996] 3 SLR(R) 268, [25]. 55  [2006] 2 SLR(R) 24, [95]. Cf Hor, previous n 14, 383–387; VR Manohar , previous n 51, 593. 
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notwithstanding, it remains fairly obvious how various provisions in Part III of the 
Evidence Act collectively whittle down the basic core of the presumption of innocence.56  
 
3.2.2  Criminal Procedure Code 2010  
The Criminal Procedure Code 201057 essentially only contains two provisions that may 
impact the scope of the right to presumption of innocence. Section 261 (see also s 23) 
provides that where the court may draw certain adverse inferences if an accused, in 
establishing his defence, remains silent or relies on facts not mentioned when he was 
charged or informed that he will be prosecuted.58 Insofar as these adverse inferences may 
operate to greatly increase the likelihood of a conviction even though the accused is 
arguably entitled to remain silent without detriment throughout the entire proceedings, 
these detract from his right to presumption of innocence.59 However, it should be noted 
that a conviction of an accused cannot be secured solely on the basis of adverse 
inferences,60 and if there are severe procedural breaches in the recording of long or 
cautioned statements from the accused, this may effectively curtail the strength of the 
adverse inferences drawn by the court.61  
The second provision is s 258, which allows the court to ‘take into consideration the 
confession’ of a co-accused when considering the guilt of the accused (they must be 
jointly tried for the same offence). Cases that have interpreted the predecessor of this 
section (s 30 of the Evidence Act, which is essentially in pari materia with s 258) have 
not been consistent as to whether a confession of a co-accused can form the sole basis of 
a conviction of the accused.62 However, the fact that there is generally no formal 
requirement of corroboration in Singapore,63 supports the view that it can. The reason 
why s 258 affects the scope of the presumption of innocence is evident once we return to 
the first principles undergirding the right, viz, a safe conviction that punishes only the 
guilty is one that relies only on relevant, reliable, and sufficient evidence. The confession 
of a co-accused will only satisfy the first criterion but probably not the next two.64  
 
 
                                                          56  See footnote 35. All of this is without first mentioning that as the law stands, the only express 
touchstone of admissibility of evidence, insofar as the Evidence Act is concerned, is that of relevance. 
Hence, even if a piece of evidence is potentially extremely prejudicial (to an accused), it may 
conceivably be admitted as long as it is relevant (as defined by the relevancy provisions of the 
Evidence Act), although the judge is free to accord little or no weight to it: see Chen Siyuan, ‘The 
Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence: Perspectives from an Indian Evidence Act 
Jurisdiction’ (forthcoming, E&P). 57  This Act can be dealt with quickly, especially following the repeal of its predecessor. For an overview 
of the changes, see generally Chng, previous n 5.  58  These inferences operate against the backdrop of a broader ‘right of silence’. See also Wan Wai Yee, 
‘”Right of Silence” and Drawing of Adverse Inference on the Accused’s Refusal to Testify at Trial’ 
[1996] 17 Singapore Law Review 88, 93; Chan Sek Keong, ‘From Justice Model to Crime Control 
Model’ (2006) International Conference on Criminal Justice Under Stress: Transnational 
Perspectives, [13]–[16]. 59  Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd ed (OUP: 2010), 580. 60  Wai Yee, previous n 58, 98. 61  Pinsler, previous n 40, 184–185. 62  Sim Ah Cheoh v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 353, 358; Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447, [113]. Cf Chin 
Seow Noi v PP [1993] 3 SLR(R) 566, [84]. 63  See generally Chen Siyuan, ‘The Corroborative Effect of Lies’ SLWC, November 2011. It is also 
noteworthy that a conviction can be secured solely on circumstantial evidence: Tan Chor Jin v PP 
[2008] 4 SLR(R) 306, [34]. However, under common law corroboration is essentially still required for 
certain contexts, such as sexual offences: see eg, AOF v PP [2012] SGCA 26. 64  It will be uncontroversial to suggest that, usually, a co-accused has an incentive to pin the blame on 
the accused. 
87 
 
3.2.3  Misuse of Drugs Act65  
The most recurring dilemma surrounding this statute concerns the operation of the 
statutory presumptions when an accused is found in possession of drugs: 
[I]n the case of drug trafficking… the prosecution would need to establish that the 
accused was knowingly in possession of controlled drugs… The facts of possession, 
knowledge and intention to traffic may be particularly difficult to prove. The [Misuse of 
Drugs Act] comes to the aid of the prosecution by providing that in certain circumstances 
such facts may be presumed unless the contrary is proven.66 
Indeed, the justifications for permitting derogation from the core conception of the 
presumption of innocence in the context of drug abuse can be both social (the effects of 
drug consumption) and practical (for instance, it is easy for an accused to deny 
knowledge of the drugs found on him). As Professors Roberts and Zuckerman lament, 
however:  
Alas, it turns out that Woolmington’s fine-sounding phrases often amount to no 
more than a rhetorical commitment to the presumption of innocence. The 
celebrated golden thread is badly frayed in places – especially where a burden of 
proof is placed on the accused by a statutory ‘reverse onus clause’. This legislative 
technique is utilized far more frequently than would ever be guessed, and the 
courts have been, one might think disturbingly, sanguine about it.67 
Operating to alleviate the bleak reality painted above is the fact that there are cases that 
say the language of a statutory provision that reallocates the burden of proof may not 
necessarily be conclusive. In Tan Ah Tee v PP,68 the Court of Appeal adopted R v 
Edwards which set out a liberal test for determining the incidence of the burden of proof 
in statutory provisions.69 This test was later modified by in R v Hunt (which was adopted 
locally in PP v Kum Chee Cheong),70 such that the court ‘is not confined to the language 
of the statute. It must look at the substance and effect of the enactment’.71 Considerations 
such as the relative ease or difficulty that the parties would encounter in discharging the 
burden of proof, the mischief at which the statute is aimed at, and the presumption that 
Parliament is unlikely to have intended to impose an onerous duty on the accused were 
also deemed relevant.72 Putting aside the (not insignificant) objection that Edwards and 
Hunt may not necessarily be compatible with the Evidence Act,73 it can be observed that 
the first consideration set out in Hunt has shades of s 108 of the Evidence Act, which has 
already been discussed above. The next two considerations correspond broadly to canons 
                                                          65  Although this is not the only statute that creates presumptions, it suffices for present purposes to 
consider just the Misuse of Drugs Act as the principles behind the controversies it generates are 
representative of and applicable to other similar statutes as well. It should further be noted that 
legislation such as the Misuse of Drugs Act is not unique to Singapore; many other jurisdictions have 
similar laws. Perhaps the greatest point of difference is that Singapore retains the mandatory death 
penalty for certain drugs offences. 66  Pinsler, previous n 40, 426.  67  Roberts and Zuckerman, previous n 59, 223–224. Cf Colin Tapper, Cross & Tapper on Evidence, 12th 
ed (OUP: 2010), 132. 68  [1980] 1 MLJ 49. 69  [1974] 3 WLR 285, 295 (Edwards). The test is: where a statute is construed as prohibiting acts ‘save 
in specified circumstances or by persons of specified classes or with specified qualifications or with 
the license or permission of special authorities’, then the burden of proof will be on the accused to 
prove that he falls within one of such situations. 70  [1993] 3 SLR(R) 737. 71  [1987] AC 352, 380 (Hunt). 72  Hunt [1987] AC 352, 376. See also Hor, previous n 14, 402–403. 73  See generally Chin Tet Yeung, ‘Burden of Proof on the Accused: An Unacceptable Exception’ 23 
Malaysia Law Review 267. 
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of statutory interpretation, being the purposive approach and the strict construction 
approach.  
As regards purposive interpretation, the Interpretation Act74 takes precedence over all 
other canons of statutory interpretation. But the exhortation to go beyond the literal words 
of a statute and into its purpose does not necessarily offer any relief for the accused: if 
parliamentary intention is paramount, parliamentary intention may plainly support a 
constriction of the rights of the accused, with the requisite provision of relevant data and 
statistics to justify such a constriction, especially in a context like the Misuse of Drugs. 
Consider too this passage from the seminal Court of Appeal decision in Tan Kiam Peng v 
PP: 
[T]he inimical effects that would result from a frustration of the general policy of the 
[Misuse of Drugs Act] generate not only social ills and tragedy but also simultaneously 
violate the individual rights of those who are adversely and directly impacted by the 
availability… of controlled drugs on the open market (including, in many instances, 
innocent members of their respective families as well). These very important aspects have 
generally been downplayed by critics of the Act… these critics never directly address the 
issue as to what the reality would be if no presumptions were in… A purely theoretical 
discourse which tends to abstract itself from the realities and adopts a one-sided 
approach… tends to not only implode by its very abstraction but also ignores the fact that, 
in an imperfect and complex world, there is necessarily a whole compendium of rights, 
all of which must be balanced.75 
Perhaps because of the harsh consequence (particularly in the context of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act where a sentence of mandatory death penalty is possible) of applying the 
purposive approach rigidly,76 the courts have been unable to apply the purposive 
approach in a principled and consistent fashion.77 For instance, in Tan Kiam Peng itself, 
although the Court of Appeal was clearly mindful of the purpose and policy underlying 
the Misuse of Drugs Act, it preferred to interpret one of the provisions (dealing with the 
presumption of knowledge of the nature of the drugs) using the literal approach, with an 
awareness that a literal reading of the provision would actually undermine a purposive 
reading of the statute.78 Notably, Tan Kiam Peng is not an anomaly; subsequent cases 
have followed its approach.79  
Recent authorities suggest that the strict construction approach of penal statutes will only 
be invoked when the purposive interpretation has been exhausted.80 Where the legislative 
intent simply cannot be found in some instances, the question is when this construction 
should apply.81 There is also the separate question of whether, in effect, the rule on strict 
construction was actually used in conjunction with the literal approach in cases82 such as 
                                                          74  Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed), s 9A(1): ‘In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, 
an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that 
purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation 
that would not promote that purpose or object’ (Interpretation Act). 75  Tan Kiam Peng v PP [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1, [75] (Tan Kiam Peng). Cf Thio Li-Ann, ‘An “I” for an “I”: 
Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional Adjudication’ (1997) 27 Hong Kong Law 
Journal 152, 160–163. 76  See also Hor, previous n 14, 372. 77  See Goh Yihan, ‘Statutory Interpretation in Singapore: 15 Years on from Legislative Reform’ [2009] 
21 SAcLJ 97, [11].  78  Tan Kiam Peng v PP [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1, [83]–[95]. 79  See eg, PP v Phuthita Somchit [2011] 3 SLR 719, [24]–[25] (Phuthita). See also ADP v ADQ [2012] 
SGCA, [29]. 80  See eg, PP v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183, [39]–[49]; PP v Mohammad Ashik bin Aris [2011] 
4 SLR 34, [190]–[194]; Ho Sheng Yu Garreth v PP [2012] SGHC 19, [44] and [55]. 81  Statutory Interpretation in Singapore, supra note 77 at [8], [18], [33]. 82  PP v Phuthita Somchit [2011] 3 SLR 719, [24]–[30].  
89 
 
Tan Kiam Peng to collectively displace the purposive approach. All in all, can it be said 
that the judicial dilemma and inconsistency in applying the purposive approach in the 
Misuse of Drugs context stems from some judicial impulse to preserve the presumption of 
innocence from being disproportionately eroded by statutory presumptions?  
 
3.3  Common Law 
It is submitted that the two common law concepts most likely to impact the scope of the 
presumption of innocence are the judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence, and the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  
Insofar as the former is concerned, as highlighted previously,83 s 2(2) of the Evidence Act 
prohibits a wholesale reception of evidence law developments in the common law world. 
This peculiar feature of Singapore evidence law has significant ramifications in the 
criminal justice process because as compared to the Evidence Act, the common law 
exclusionary rules provide greater control and flexibility over the admissibility of 
evidence such as those relating to hearsay, similar fact, and opinion. The common law 
further provides for a residual judicial discretion to exclude evidence not caught by the 
exclusionary rules if it either causes some form of unfairness to the accused or is found to 
be disproportionately prejudicial or unreliable.84 So whereas the common law will either 
exclude (by way of the exclusionary rules) or give the judge the discretion to exclude say, 
a piece of similar fact evidence that is highly prejudicial, this is not necessarily consistent 
with (and therefore permitted by) the antiquated and static Evidence Act, which considers 
questions of admissibility solely on the basis of logical relevance.85 The reason why any 
of this has to do with the presumption of innocence is that if one equates prejudicial effect 
with cognitive bias and emotivism,86 the Evidence Act in permitting a piece of evidence 
tainted with such prejudicial effect to be admitted creates a potential danger of a judge 
(who, unlike a jury, does not have the benefit of a prior fact-finder to sieve out prejudicial 
evidence) wrongly judging the guilt of an accused based on evidence that has severely 
distorted evidential value. This may not be apparent from the record of the case or the 
judgment. As such, the commitment to punish only the guilty on the basis of the most 
reliable and morally defensible evidence is upended. The unavailability of the common 
law judicial discretion to exclude evidence also eliminates the chief alternative to the 
defence of entrapment (which has been held to be unavailable in Singapore).87 
Increasingly, there is reason to believe that the judicial discretion to exclude evidence can 
possibly be extended to exclude entrapment evidence, because the normative 
justifications for the discretion have now been re-identified as the need to preserve and 
                                                          83  See footnote 37 and body text accompanying footnote. 84  See also legislation such as the UK Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s78; Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, s 24(2). In fact the latest 2012 amendments to the 
opinion evidence provisions in the Evidence Act, in expressly providing for the judicial discretion to 
exclude prejudicial opinion evidence, only serve to confirm that such discretion did not previously 
exist in the statute.  85  See generally Siyuan, previous n 56; Chen Siyuan and Nicholas Poon, ‘Reliability and Relevance as 
the Touchstones for Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings’ (forthcoming, SAcLJ); Robert 
Margolis, ‘The Concept of Relevance: In the Evidence Act and the Modern View’ (1990) 11 
Singapore Law Review 24. 86  See Ho Hock Lai, ‘An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence’ (1998) 19 Singapore Law Review 166, 
167–170. 87  See Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239. There is also the 
possibility of the court invoking its inherent powers to prevent unfairness or injustice at trial; suffice to 
say, however, that the exercise of such powers (understandably) has to be extremely judicious and 
limited to special circumstances. 
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uphold the moral legitimacy of adjudication in criminal proceedings,88 as well as the need 
to ‘prevent injustice’.89 Both justifications appear broad enough to exclude entrapment 
evidence if, perhaps, the circumstances are egregious enough. But even if that is the case, 
what does entrapment have to do with presumption of innocence? Two hypothetical 
situations may be contrasted. 
In the first situation, suppose there is an undercover officer who has infiltrated a criminal 
organisation dealing with drugs. There is evidence that the organisation dabbles in drugs, 
but there is nothing that will directly link the organisation’s criminal activities to its 
leader. The undercover officer’s job is to induce the leader to directly perform a 
transaction with a set of buyers who are actually undercover officers, so that there will be 
evidence to secure his conviction. Assuming the transaction materialises and the leader is 
subsequently convicted, there will probably be little objection (from the perspective of the 
moral legitimacy of the criminal justice process or otherwise) to the use and admissibility 
of such evidence. In the second situation, suppose a plainclothes officer stakes out in a 
pub and randomly attempts to induce one of the pub-goers to purchase synthetic drugs 
from him. He spots a pub-goer who looks particularly down-and-out. The pub-goer 
consistently refuses to purchase the drugs despite a long period of pestering, but 
eventually caves in when he is offered the drugs at a very low price. Can it not be said 
that such a pub-goer would never have committed the crime but for the persistent 
instigation of the officer? Not only is the pub-goer not presumed innocent, he is made 
guilty. If it be suggested that he would have, at some later point, purchased drugs anyway 
from someone else, why should it be lightly presumed that this supposition is necessarily 
true in the absence of compelling evidence, and indeed why should it be lightly presumed 
that he was even ever going to visit a pub again? Indeed, Professor Ho’s characterisation 
of the criminal justice process is worth reflection: 
It is for the police to search for the truth… If the executive does not think it has found the 
truth, it should not be bringing a prosecution. By the time of the trial… the executive 
must produce the evidential basis for, and publicly justify, its assertion that the citizen is 
guilty as charged and thus deserving of the punishment that it is seeking to inflict on him 
or her. It is not enough that the executive believes or asserts that the citizen is guilty, nor 
is it enough that he or she is in fact guilty; the court must deliver an acquittal, and let the 
citizen go free, unless the executive succeeds in demonstrating his or her guilt in a proper 
manner... ustice must not only be done… but must also be seen to be done...90  
Turning then to the privilege against self-incrimination (which is related to the concept of 
drawing adverse inferences), common law dictates that if an accused is, for instance, 
improperly coerced to provide an incriminating document, the court has the discretion to 
exclude such evidence.91 However, whereas the Evidence Act is only arguably 
incompatible with the exclusionary discretion doctrine as discussed above, the Evidence 
Act is expressly at odds with the common law privilege against self-incrimination. The 
Act does not generally excuse witnesses from answering incriminating questions at trial, 
and in fact expressly admits evidence obtained from the accused after the commission of 
the offence.92 It was therefore no surprise that Court of Appeal in PP v Mazlan denied 
                                                          88  See generally Andrew Ashworth, ‘What is Wrong with Entrapment?’ [1999] SJLS 293; Edwin Tong, 
‘Illegally Obtained Evidence and the Concept of Abuse of Process: a Possible Reconciliation?’ (1994) 
15 Singapore Law Review 97.  89  See eg, Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205, [112] (Kadar). 90  Ho Hock Lai, ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ (2010) SJLS 87, 89 (emphasis added). 91  Jeffrey Pinsler, ‘Whether a Singapore Court has a Discretion to Exclude Evidence Admissible in 
Criminal Proceedings’, (2010) 22 SAcLJ 335, [8]–[11]. 92  Ibid, [40]. He was referring to ss 29 and 134 of the Evidence Act. 
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that the privilege enjoyed constitutional status (it was described as just another 
evidentiary rule).93  
Additionally, although s 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 states that an accused 
‘need not say anything that might expose him to a criminal charge’, there is no obligation 
to inform him of this (and there is no consequence for not informing him).94 Arguably, 
this completely defeats the purpose of having the provision in the first place. Having said 
that, it has been claimed that the privilege against self-incrimination has lost much of its 
force (and justification) in various parts of the common law world,95 and if that is so, 
unlike the exclusionary discretion doctrine, the erosion of this privilege will have a lesser 
impact on the contours of the right of presumption of innocence. On another view, 
however, a fundamental link may be drawn between the privilege and the presumption of 
innocence: 
Interrogations [in Singapore] proceed on the basis of a strong presumption of guilt, where 
interrogators rely on psychological pressures to force a confession… This is compounded 
by the interest of the police in quick crime-solving that may lead to a wrongful 
conviction. The argument based on the presumption of innocence is as follows: the 
inherent nature of police interrogation imposes great pressure on the accused to confess. 
The secrecy of these proceedings leaves the court with no reliable evidence regarding the 
circumstances in which the confession was made. In accordance with the presumption of 
innocence, the court should hold that there is reasonable doubt regarding the confession’s 
reliability and give the accused the benefit of the doubt.96 
3.4  International Law 
The final source of law to be considered is international law. International law is relevant 
insofar as it can potentially affect municipal law.97 Singapore subscribes to the ‘dualist’ 
approach in the reception of international law. Thereby, its international legal obligations 
are only given effect when domestic laws reflecting the incorporation of those obligations 
are passed. Moreover, international law ‘is not concerned with how customary 
international norms are implemented by the various states’, and ‘while international law is 
binding on states, and states are obligated to give effect to their international legal 
obligations, international law does not replace or supersede the domestic law of state’.98  
The presumption of innocence can be found expressly in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,99 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,100 and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.101 Certainly, a strong case can be made that the 
right has the status of international custom, or even a general principle of law. The main 
problem is that the right, although common to all of the major international instruments, 
is stated in such bare terms such that its contents are vague. Quite apart from the fact that 
states like Singapore can ignore their international obligations, they are still given free 
rein to dictate how much the right to the presumption of innocence can be whittled down 
on domestic implementation.  
                                                          93  [1992] 3 SLR(R) 968, [13]–[37]. 94  See also Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981] 2 MLJ 49, [26]. 95  Tapper, previous n 67, 417–418; Roberts and Zuckerman, previous n 59, 511, 577–580. 96  Gregory Gan, ‘The Crippled Accused: Miranda Rights in Singapore’ (2010) 28 Singapore Law 
Review 123, 137. 97  Statute of the International Court of Justice, TS 993, Art 38(1). 98  Chen Siyuan, ‘The Relationship Between International Law and Domestic Law,’ (2011) 23 SAcLJ 
350, [7]–[10] (emphasis in original).  99  GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), Art 11(1). 100  999 UNTS 171, Art 14(2). 101  ETS 5, Art 6(2) (ECHR). See also Hor, previous n 14, 369. 
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Unsurprisingly, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has warned that ‘the 
presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, is 
expressed in very ambiguous terms or entails conditions which render it ineffective’.102 
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has said that the ECHR ‘must be 
interpreted in such a way as to guarantee rights which are practical as opposed to 
theoretical or illusory.’103 While it is true that existing international law permits the state 
the sovereign prerogative to limit the right of presumption of innocence as it sees fit, it 
may not be long before the ever-progressive development of international human rights 
law places a more concrete obligation on all states to take into greater account the rights 
of individuals, and accordingly, to avoid as far as possible any derogation from the 
presumption of innocence.   
 
4  SOME PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON THE SURVEY 
It is apposite to recapitulate the results of the survey of the law thus far: 
1) The preponderance of authorities and a literal interpretation suggest that the right to 
presumption of innocence is not guaranteed by the Constitution, although a limited 
aspect of it, viz, the right to counsel, is arguably captured. The right to counsel, 
however, is subject to various limitations. 
2) The Evidence Act potentially erodes the right to presumption of innocence via ss 105, 
107 and 108. The rather antiquated and static Evidence Act also conceptualises 
relevance and admissibility more broadly than the common law, as as to affect the 
scope of the right to presumption of innocence if one accepts that the right demands 
that only the most reliable and morally defensible evidence are admitted.  
3) The Criminal Procedure Code 2010 potentially erodes the right to presumption of 
innocence via ss 23, 261 and (possibly) 258. 
4) The Misuse of Drugs Act is an example of a penal statute that potentially erodes the 
right to presumption of innocence. It does so by creating certain presumptions of fact 
regarding possession, knowledge, and intention.  
5) Though not canvassed in the survey, it may be thought that the possibility of 
preventive detention without trial (pursuant to legislation such as the Internal Security 
Act104 and the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act105) also detracts from the 
right to presumption of innocence. However, insofar as such persons are not detained 
pursuant to conventional criminal justice processes, and insofar as preventive 
detention is typically justified on what are often characterised as sui generis grounds 
of national security, they will not be considered in this article. 
6) While there is probably a rule of international custom protecting the right to 
presumption of innocence, it does not automatically translate into municipal law; at 
any rate, the content of such a right has seldom been explicated, and states are given 
free rein to define it, at least not until international human rights law develops 
something more concrete. 
                                                          102  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No 13, 21st session (1984), 
[7]. 103  Allenet de Ribemont v France [1995] ECHR 5, [35]; cf Salabiaku v France (1991) 13 EHRR 379, 
[27]. See also Roberts and Zuckerman, previous n 59, 86. 104  (Cap 143A, 1985 Rev Ed). 105  (Cap 67, 1998 Rev Ed). 
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At this point, what can we make of the results of this preliminary survey? Some 
reflections, also preliminary in nature, may be offered.106  
Under the Woolmington conception of the presumption of innocence, an accused may in 
theory simply opt to say or do nothing at all until the prosecution has produced sufficient 
evidence to establish a case against him. There are no reversals of proof, presumptions of 
fact, removal of privileges, or inferences operating against him that will be entertained 
under the purist, Woolmington conception, of the presumption of innocence. This is, 
however, not the reality today, not just in Singapore but in many other jurisdictions– the 
purist conception of the presumption of innocence is no longer seen as tenable (even if 
constantly invoked by the courts). This is, perhaps more so in the context of legislative 
attempts to control serious crimes or crimes that can cause widespread damage to 
society.107 But in the same way that the right to presumption of innocence is not absolute, 
the legislative-judicial prerogative to whittle down the right should also not be without 
limits, and such limits should be explained, even if the curtailment of the right is claimed 
to be confined to the most serious crimes.108 
Indeed, even if we accept that the presumption of innocence is a balance, the actual ambit 
of this right has to be seen in the light of all the existing laws in their cumulative effect. 
On the basis of the results of the survey in this article, the holistic picture is not one that 
can be said to be more favourable than not to accused persons in Singapore. The 
theoretical potential for the cumulative erosion of presumption of innocence in Singapore 
is perhaps the grimmest for a person accused of drugs offences. Accordingly, the strength 
of the right to presumption of innocence in Singapore may be considered weak in light of 
the various ways in which the right may be eroded.109  
Quite separately, one has to question too if certain longstanding assumptions and 
characteristics of the Singapore criminal justice system are necessarily true. That is, in 
contrast to jurors, judges can be effective fact-finders and deciders of the law 
simultaneously;110 the adversarial system, especially in criminal proceedings, necessarily 
promotes the pursuit of truth and justice;111 harsh punishments, including the mandatory 
death penalty, successfully serve their deterrent functions;112 and wrongful convictions 
have largely been avoided.113 If these assumptions can be said to be largely unproven or 
untested (and this is quite different from saying the assumptions are untrue), this also 
undermines the commitment to punish only the guilty. Perhaps a solution to counteract 
                                                          106  They are preliminary because the primary purpose of this piece is to establish the extent of the 
protection of the right in Singapore. 107  See also Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-kut [1993] 3 WLR 329, 346; GL Peiris, ‘The 
Burden of Proof and Standards of Proof in Criminal Proceedings’ (1980) Malaysia Law Review 66, 
103–106. Indeed, in Woolmington itself, the court acknowledged various possible exceptions to the 
presumption of innocence. 
108  See also Sek Keong, previous n 58, [20].  109  However, can a case be made that the various laws actually do (short of expressly providing for the 
presumption of innocence) promote the pursuit of the truth, fairness, and justice, and accordingly, 
protect the rights of the accused? 110  See Tet Yeung, previous n 6, [6]. 111  First, for a criminal justice system using the adversarial process to operate well, what is required is a 
constant supply of good prosecutors and defence lawyers. Second, unlike the civil law inquisitorial 
system, the common law adversarial system prevents a judge from being interventionist. 112  See eg, Parliament of Singapore, Misuse of Drugs (Amendment Bill) (30 November 1989) Parliament 
No 7 Session No 1 Volume No 54 Sitting No 9. Most criminal law exponents would know, of course, 
that the function of criminal law goes beyond deterrence but also includes aims relating to retribution, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 113  See generally Chen Siyuan and Eunice Chua, ‘Wrongful Convictions in Singapore: A General Survey 
of Risk Factors’ [2010] 28 Singapore Law Review 98.  
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this is to give greater expression to the right of presumption of innocence, or at the very 
least, to be aware of how the right may be whittled down. 
There is no doubt that preserving some form of the right to the presumption of innocence 
is instrumental to preserving the integrity and credibility of a criminal justice system.114 
To this end, the foremost problem in Singapore at this point is that up till now, no one 
authoritative guide has been articulated as to where the right can be found, and what it 
entails. What Singapore has, instead, are largely perfunctory references to Woolmington 
or its equivalent rhetoric, unresolved contradictions and blind spots in the law, and bits 
and pieces of legal principles waiting to be marshalled into a coherent thread of 
interconnected rules. Perhaps, as argued at the outset, what is needed is a reboot in the 
conceptualisation of the right, beginning with the identifying of a conceptual starting 
point. For instance, as Ashworth puts it:  
[T]he presumption of innocence is justified, not by its relationship to any basic facts 
about evidence, but by reference to the context of a criminal trial – with fundamental 
liberties at stake for the defendant – and more widely the context of a criminal justice 
system in which enormous powers over individuals may be wielded by the State… the 
presumption is inherent in a proper relationship between State and citizen, because there 
is a considerable imbalance of resources… because the trial system is known to be 
fallible… because conviction and punishment constitute official censure… and respect for 
individual dignity and autonomy requires that proper measures be taken to ensure that 
such censure does not fall on the innocent.115 
Likewise, Roberts and Zuckerman opine that: 
A ‘presumption of innocence’ is only truly valuable if it carries robust implications for 
criminal procedure generally… [it] must be reasonably extensive and not too easily 
defeated… The presumption… would hardly be much to boast about unless, at the least, it 
required the state to prove every element of a criminal offence to an appropriately 
exacting standard… [this is also bound up with the idea of] the right of the innocent not to 
suffer criminal conviction and punishment… From a broader, political theory or 
philosophical perspective, one might expect the presumption of innocence to say 
something important about the relationship between the state and the individual…116 
It seems that the basic idea here is since the state has far more resources than an accused, 
the right to presumption of innocence has to be strong and not easily displaced for it to be 
meaningful. Accordingly, the limits to the derogation of the right should be properly 
articulated, as should the justifications for such derogation. Moreover, the scope of the 
right should be construed expansively, rather than constrictively, and with a view to 
securing the safest and most morally defensible conviction possible.117 Two broad 
patterns of recent vintage also confirm that Singapore is experiencing a paradigm shift in 
how the rights of an accused and the communitarian rights of society should be weighed 
and balanced against each other, with increasing emphasis being placed on reinforcing the 
integrity of the criminal justice process generally and protecting the rights of an accused 
specifically. Going forward, perhaps something can be learned from these two broad 
patterns insofar as reconceptualising the right to presumption of innocence is concerned. 
The first broad pattern emanates from a trio of recent Court of Appeal decisions. In 
Kadar, two brothers had been sentenced to death by the trial judge for the murder of an 
                                                          114  See eg, Hor, previous n 14, 366. 115  Ashworth, previous n 12, 251. See also Ashworth, ‘Concepts of Criminal Justice’ [1979] Criminal 
Law Review 412, 418. 116  Roberts and Zuckerman, previous n 59, 223. 
117  See also Stummer, previous n 4, p 51. 
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old woman, but one of the brothers was completely acquitted of all charges on appeal due 
to unreliable evidence. The Court of Appeal established ground-breaking guidelines 
concerning the prosecution’s duty to disclose material unused for the trial,118 but in so 
doing, it condemned certain practices of the police and the prosecution in 
unprecedentedly strong language.119 Then, in Thong Ah Fat v PP, the trial judge found 
the accused guilty of trafficking drugs and sentenced him to death; on appeal, the Court of 
Appeal remitted the matter, criticised the brief, five-paragraph judgment as ‘unclear’, and 
held that the ‘judicial duty to give reasoned decisions’ was not discharged.120 This 
decision was also unprecedented in the way in which the trial judgment was criticised and 
for the establishment of guidelines for reasoned fact-finding.121 Finally, in Ramalingam, 
although the Court of Appeal stated in obiter dicta that prosecutorial decisions need not 
be explained (mainly because the Attorney-General’s right of prosecutorial discretion is a 
constitutional right), it nevertheless felt compelled to offer some explanations as to why 
the accused in that case was charged with an offence that attracted the mandatory death 
penalty while the co-accused was not despite committing the same criminal 
transaction.122 At the very least, this trio of recent Court of Appeal cases would suggest 
that justice and fairness to the accused must not only be done, but must also be seen to be 
done.  
Indeed, temporally proximate to these cases is also a raft of other local cases that clearly 
reveal courts’ growing inclination towards a higher degree of accountability by the 
various law enforcement agencies when seeking convictions. In Yunani bin Abdul Hamid 
v PP,123 the court exercised its powers of revision to order a retrial as it treated the 
accused’s plea of guilt as very doubtful. In Lim Boon Keong v PP,124 the court remarked 
that the Health Sciences Authority had a duty to ensure rigid compliance with its internal 
procedures to avoid wrongful convictions. In Ong Pang Siew v PP,125 the court readily 
criticised the prosecution’s expert for falling short of professional standards. In 
Mathavakannan s/o Kalimuthu v Attorney-General,126 the court resolved the phrase 
“imprisoned for life” in a presidentially commuted sentence (the original sentence was 
mandatory death) in the accused’s favour to mean 20 years’ imprisonment. In Azman bin 
Mohamed Sanwan v PP,127 the court closely scrutinised the events surrounding the 
recording of two self-inculpatory statements and found them to be unreliable in many 
ways. In AOF v PP, the court exonerated the accused from a 29-year and 24-stroke 
sentence (for allegedly raping his then 16-year-old daughter) after another extremely 
granular scrutiny of the evidential gaps.128 Finally, in Mas Swan bin Adnan v PP, the 
court held that a ‘trial judge should not shut his mind to any alternative defence that is 
                                                          118  See also Chen Siyuan, ‘The Prosecution’s Duty of Disclosure in Singapore’ (2012) OUCLJ 207.  119  Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205, [194]–[206]. Kadar was subsequently applied in 
AOF v PP [2012] SGCA 26, [149]–[152]. 120  [2011] SGCA 65, [13]. 121  See also Chen Siyuan and Nicholas Poon, ‘The Judicial Duty to Give Reasons’, SLWC, December 
2011.  122  Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] SGCA 2, [77]–[78]. See also Quek Hock Lye v PP 
[2012] SGCA 25, [22]–[25]. 
123  [2008] 3 SLR(R) 383. 
124  [2010] SGHC 179. 
125  [2011] 1 SLR 606. See also Eu Lim Hoklai v PP [2011] 3 SLR 167. 
126  [2012] SGHC 39. 
127  [2012] SGCA 19. 
128  The Court of Appeal also went one step further in terms of extending protection to the accused: 
instead of ordering a re-trial after new crucial evidence had emerged after the trial, it took the view 
that given the evidence at the original trial was insufficient to justify a conviction and that the length 
of time before the putative retrial was disproportionate to the accused’s sentence, the fairer outcome 
was an acquittal. 
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reasonably available on the evidence even though it may be inconsistent with the 
accused’s primary defence… or even if the Prosecution and Defence have agreed not to 
raise it.’129 Of course, one way to look at all of these cases is to characterise them as an 
judicial attempt to compensate for the many doctrinal uncertainties and unsatisfactorily 
rigid rules that plague criminal evidence law in general and the right to presumption of 
innocence specifically. On the one hand, there is some validity in criticising a (perceived 
or otherwise) lack of principle and internal consistency in the application of the law; on 
the other hand, to take such a view may create unnecessary, invisible impediments that 
detract from the courts’ ultimate purpose: to safeguard the rights of every member in 
society. 
Suppositions and speculations aside, the second broad pattern is perhaps best reflected by 
recent academic observations. The last two years have been littered with ad hoc attempts 
to amend various parts of the Evidence Act, such as expanding the scope of the hearsay 
and opinion exceptions and repealing the computer output provisions. Just before these 
developments, however, Professor Chin argued that the Evidence Act was in timely need 
of a major remake. He concluded that maximum individualisation, procedural fairness, 
and legitimacy in adjudication are the key contemporary values that are largely missing 
from the antiquated Evidence Act, and should be used to guide any attempt to rewrite the 
code.130 Then in 2011, following the introduction of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, 
Chng opined that ‘a new chapter in the continuing evolution of Singapore’s criminal 
justice process’ had been written, and described the new legislation as ‘a further milestone 
in the journey where “society seeks to strike a balance between: the rights of society, to 
secure conviction of a person who commits an offence; and the rights of an individual, 
not to be wrongly convicted”’.131 She further opined that it can no longer,  
fairly be said that an unthinking preference for crime control values is all that the 
Singapore system is about… Singapore’s reformative approach to criminal procedure is 
commendable, if nothing else, for its commitment to leaving no stone unturned and no 
avenue unconsidered.132  
These two academic viewpoints, with the judicial trends sketched above, show that 
perhaps the time is indeed ripe to take a fresh look at the right to presumption of 
innocence in Singapore. It is with humble hope that this article has served its purpose: 
setting out the basic operative legal framework to kick-start that process. It may also 
serve as a platform for further discourse on the issues raised.133 
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